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The Cy Pres Remedy: Procedure or
Substance?
By GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.*
Y PRES RECOVERY IS usually considered from a procedural view-
point. The issue arises most commonly in class actions on behalf of a
large number of prospective claimants whose number and identity are
difficult to determine. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure' and state law counterparts govern class action lawsuits. 2 Under
Rule 23, courts have broad authority to determine the size and shape
of the class, review and approve any settlement, and review and ap-
prove procedures for distribution of any award.3 Hence, the problem
is considered a matter of procedure. And so it is.
However, courts may also consider the matter of cy pres in terms
of the substantive law basis of the claim against the defendant and
related concepts in the law of remedies. I wish to suggest that some
clarification of the doctrine can result from looking at it in this way.
* Miller Distinguished Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of
California. Member of the State Bar of California.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
2. See, e.g., Larner v. L.A. Doctors Hosp. Assocs., LP, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324, 332 (Ct.
App. 2008) (providing that California law controls class actions to the extent the law exists,
and if California law does not exist, the Federal Rules may provide persuasive authority).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("The claims ... of a certified class . .. may be settled ... only
with the court's approval." "[T]he court may approve [a settlement, dismissal, or compro-
mise] . . . after . . . finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate."); see also Horton v.
Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 483 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The decision to grant or
to deny certification is ... initially committed to the sound discretion of the district judge,
and the decision will not be overturned except for abuse of discretion."); Madison Cnty.
Jail Inmates v. Thompson, 773 F.2d 834, 845 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The district court has con-
siderable discretion in determining whether settlement is fair and reasonable.").
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To begin with, the observer should remember that the concept of
cy pres as applied in class suits is borrowed from the law of trusts, par-
ticularly charitable trusts." In the administration of charitable trusts
the specific charitable purpose specified in the trust instrument may
be difficult or impossible to carry out. For example, a specific charita-
ble purpose can become obsolete or even illegal. Consider the Girard
College case that arose some decades ago in Philadelphia.5 The trust in
that case was established early in the 19th century for the purpose of
furthering the education of young men; the beneficiaries were young
white men.6 A court later found the racial limitation to be illegal be-
cause the trustee was a public entity governed by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7
Upon such an eventuality, the choice is to invalidate the trust or
to administer it in different terms but in the same general direction as
specified in the terms of the trust. The law has considered-correctly
in my view-that the latter choice is better. In other words, courts
should identify a "second best" fulfillment of the trust purpose.
Adaptation of this concept to class suits is not direct but rather is
by analogy. The analogy of course is that, given a defendant's obliga-
tion to pay, and given that the identity of the payees is difficult or
impossible to determine, the "second best" approach is to disburse the
payment to some set of people or cause that is situated more or less
like the injured group. However, such a decision must be based on an
initial determination that the defendant should indeed be made to
pay.
It is at this point that some courts have hesitated or stopped.8 The
theory could be that there is no justiciable obligation if the supposed
4. See Brooks v. Duckworth, 67 S.E.2d 752, 754 (N.C. 1951) ("Where changes in con-
ditions not contemplated by the trustor have rendered impossible the accomplishment of
the charitable purposes intended by the devise of property in trust, the equitable jurisdic-
tion of the court may be invoked to modify the terms of the trust in order to give effect to
the general intent expressed in the will."); Estate of Gatlin v. Yates, 94 Cal. Rptr. 295 (Ct.
App. 1971) (stating that cy pres allows courts to carry out testamentary trusts established for
charitable purposes).
5. In re Girard Coll. Trusteeship, 138 A.2d 844 (Pa. 1958).
6. Id. at 845.
7. Id. at 846.
8. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1010-12 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating
that fluid recovery is not possible and class action is not manageable because there is no
reliable or rational way to determine class members), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156
(1974); Collins v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 231 Cal. Rptr. 638, 646 (Ct. App. 1986) ("Where, as
here, the occurrence is of an accidental nature, the defendants are shown to have re-
sponded immediately to protect the public, where steps were taken at considerable eco-
nomic cost to prevent recurrence, and where all but a relatively small portion of the 'ill-
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victims could not be identified, and the courts could raise this issue
themselves. A plausible case can be made that no liability may prop-
erly be imposed if there are no specific persons to whom the liability
can run. But, as others argue, it is wrong that a wrongdoer may escape
merely because its victims cannot be specifically identified. This pro-
position has special force when the wrongdoing was widespread and
carried out in such a way that the victims did not notice or had no
practical opportunity to protest.
At this point it is useful to refer to another part of the law of
trusts-the general duties imposed on a fiduciary. There is good law
that a person acting in a fiduciary capacity, and taking possession of
money in that capacity, has a duty to account.9 Once it is established
that a person took possession of money properly belonging to some-
one else, that person is a trustee-sometimes called a "constructive
trustee."10 The amount of the constructive trust can be determined in
various ways, depending on the pathway by which the money was ac-
crued. Once the amount is determined, the law requires that the trus-
tee account for it.1 More specifically, the law does not require the
wronged person to prove how the accused has misused the money but
does require proof of the amount at issue and legal misuse.12 The
accused must show either that no misuse was involved or that the
amount is less than has been alleged."3 If the accused fails in that ef-
fort, he must disgorge the money.14 The law does not permit a trustee
to keep the proceeds of the breach of trust.
Moreover, if I am right about the concept, the trustee is liable not
merely for loss to the fund but also must disgorge any profit realized
from his misuse of the fund for his own benefit.15
This branch of the law of trusts is both procedural and substan-
tive. It is procedural in allocating to claimants the burden of proving
the existence of a trust relationship while allocating to the defendant
the burden of exculpation of wrongdoing. It is substantive in that it
requires the wrongdoer to disgorge. The duty to disgorge is enforced
gotten gain' was in fact consumed in the production, sorting, packaging, shipping and
marketing of the contaminated product, we do not believe fluid recovery is useful in fulfil-
ling the purpose of the underlying action.").
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. e (2003).
10. See Anderson v. Bellino, 658 N.W.2d. 645, 658 (Neb. 2003).
11. Id. at 658-59.
12. See United States v. Herbawi, 972 F. Supp. 171, 174 (W.D.N.Y 1997).
13. See Rollins v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 1990).
14. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471 (rev. 3d
ed. 2010).
15. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515 (1980).
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quite apart from the question of to whom the money should be paid.
This is because the law disfavors allowing the wrongdoing trustee to
keep the proceeds of the wrong.
Cy pres in class actions could be approached in this light. I call to
mind the situations involved in three well-known cases: Daar v. Yellow
Cab Co.,16 Eisen v. Carlisle &t Jacquelin,'7 and Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts.18 I refer to the "situations" in these cases, not the specific issues
or holdings but rather to the relationships involved. I want to focus on
the characteristics of the defendants' alleged conduct under substan-
tive law.
Daar was a suit against the Yellow Cab Company in which the
plaintiff contended that the company had manipulated the meters on
its taxicabs to record higher fares than permitted under a governing
ordinance.19 The alleged misconduct was therefore a regulatory one.
Eisen involved a claim that securities brokers on the New York Stock
Exchange had conspired to fix their charges in violation of the Sher-
man Act.20 The alleged misconduct was both a criminal and civil viola-
tion. 21 Phillips Petroleum involved a claim by gas company investors who
sought recovery of interest on royalties owed by a gas company.22 The
gas company had suspended payments while awaiting a Federal Power
Commission ("FPC") ruling on gas prices.23 The alleged misconduct,
in substantive law terms, was a classic constructive trust case: a party
(the Phillips company) holding money to which others (the royalty
payees) were entitled.24
I submit that the nature of these wrongs would justify the remedy
of disgorgement. The misconduct in each case was not merely negli-
gent or even grossly negligent; it was intentional and indeed system-
atic. 25 The alleged misconduct in Daar and Eisen was also criminal.26
The Phillips case is much more problematic because there was a sub-
stantial legal question about the proper handling of the royalties
16. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967).
17. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
18. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
19. Daar, 433 P.2d at 736-38.
20. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 160-61.
21. Id.
22. Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 799.
23. Id. at 800.
24. Id. See generally Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213-14
(2002) (defining constructive trust).
25. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 736-38 (Cal. 1967); Eisen, 417 U.S. at
160-61; Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 799-801.
26. Daar, 433 P.2d at 736; Eisen, 417 U.S. at 160-61.
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pending the FPC ruling on gas prices.27 However, one could imagine
a different scenario in which holding back the royalties would be
clearly unjustified. On that basis, it would be a classic breach of the
fiduciary duty to account.
A recognized remedy for such a wrong is the duty of a construc-
tive trustee to account. The rule governing the duty to account com-
pels the wrongdoer to surrender the illegally appropriated fund,
including any profit realized during the period of wrongful posses-
sion, together with legal interest.28
Conclusion
In considering application of cy pres in class actions, I suggest that
the character of the wrong involved is highly relevant to the nature of
the remedy. The cy pres concept in its class suit application facilitates
the remedy of disgorgement. It is disgorgement of lucre that was ill-
gotten by means that were studiedly and systematically wrong, not
merely accidental, negligent, or under a good-faith claim of legitimate
possession. In such situations, it is reasonable to suggest that concern
over the sanctioning of a wrongdoer outweighs the concern that there
are no specific, identifiable victims.
The search for appropriate distribution of the disgorgement is
not very difficult. In Daar, the fund could have been used to pay cab
fares for poor people going to and from hospitals. In Eisen, the fund
could have gone to business schools to establish courses in securities
law or business ethics. In Phillips, it could have gone to environmental
preservation or some such purpose.
27. Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 799-800.
28. Women's Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Nev. Nat'l Bank, 673 F. Supp. 401, 404 (D.
Nev. 1987).
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